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Sortition, i.e. random appointment for public duty, has been employed by societies throughout the years
as a firewall designated to prevent illegitimate interference between parties in a legal case and agents of
the legal system. In judicial systems of modern western countries, random procedures are mainly
employed to select the jury, the court and/or the judge in charge of judging a legal case. Therefore,
these random procedures play an important role in the course of a case, and should comply with some
principles, such as transparency and complete auditability. Nevertheless, these principles are neglected
by random procedures in some judicial systems, which are performed in secrecy and are not auditable
by the involved parties. The assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court is an example of such a
procedure, for it is performed using procedures unknown to the parties involved in the judicial cases.
This article presents a review of how sortition has been historically employed by societies and discusses
how Mathematical Statistics may be applied to random procedures of the judicial system, as it has been
applied for almost a century on clinical trials, for example. A statistical model for assessing randomness
in case assignment is proposed and applied to the Brazilian Supreme Court. As final remarks, guidelines
for the development of good randomization procedures are outlined.
Keywords: sortition, case assignment, Brazilian Supreme Court, statistical modelling, randomness.
Let the lot be shaken for all of you, and see who is chosen
Iliad, VII, 171.
Casting the dice puts judgement quarrels to rest and keeps powerful parts separated
Proverbs 18: 18.
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1. Introduction
The judicial systems of modern western states make use of randomization procedures. Important
decisions in the course of a judicial case are made by rolling dice. This may be perceived as an
unnatural or counter-intuitive expedient. Why should the flip of a coin take part in casting the fate of a
legal case? Why should we abdicate making (best-informed) deterministic decisions? The next three
sections address these questions, after a brief historical review. The following two sections present a
statistical analysis designed to test the effective randomness of case assignment in the Brazilian
Supreme Court. The last section gives our final remarks.
1.1 Running democracy and rolling the dice
The city-state of Athens was the undisputed champion in the use of sortition (random appointment) for
managing its public affairs, especially in the period between the democratic reforms of Kleisthenes, in
507 BCE, and the fall of Athenian democracy, in 322 BCE; see Dowlen (2009), Hansen (1999),
Headlam (1933) and Staveley (1972). While some specialized officers were elected based on specific
expertise and experience, like military chiefs, water supply and treasury managers, religious priests
etc., most of the public duties in Athens were carried out by citizens of the polis, that held short term
positions appointed by a system based on district representation, sortition and frequent rotation.
Sortition was also used to constitute dikasteria, citizen’s courts where dike (fair justice) was served.
From a total of approximately 30 000 men recognized as qualified citizens (excluding women, slaves,
foreigners and their descendants and other non-represented categories), 6000 district representatives
would be selected to the general assembly and, out of those, 501 individuals would be randomly
chosen to constitute a dikasterion. Some specially important cases would require a larger court of
justice, with up to 2501 members! Moreover, in contrast to contemporary jurors, dikastai swore by the
Heliastic Oath not to discuss the case in judgement among each other. In contrast, each dikastes should
vote, by secret ballot, according to his individual and independent opinion, expressing his own best
knowledge of the law and concern for the public good; see Hansen (1999, p. 182).
Implementation of a democratic system based on the Heliastic oath required a corresponding reform
of the Athenian social organization and representation system. In the oligarchic society, predating
Kleisthenes reforms of 507 BCE, civil duties were performed by representatives sent by their phratria
(brotherhood)—a sub-group within traditional phyle (clans or tribes). After the reforms, representatives
were elected in their demos—a geographically defined district or neighborhood, see Hansen (1999).
The Hebrew bible uses randomization devices for several purposes, including ritualistic divination
and judgement, and also as a practical tool for appeasement or fair distribution of goods and services;
see for example, Leviticus 16: 8–10, Numbers 26: 56, 1Chronicles 26: 13, Proverbs 16: 33 and Jonah 1:
7. Biblical use of randomization was a strong argument for its practical adoption for political and legal
procedures in Christian Europe, notwithstanding moral objections to gambling and philosophical
concerns about voluntarily relaxing the grip of reason and relinquishing important decisions to fate.
Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy (12th to 17th century) saw many political experiments in the
use of sortition to randomly appoint citizens for legislative and executive positions or legal functions,
the two most important prototypes being the Florentine scrutiny and the Venetian brevia; see Najemy
(1982) and Wolfson (1899). In England and the USA sortition was (and still is) mostly used for jury
duty appointment, with mandatory random selection officially documented since the 17th century; see
Dowlen (2009). Nowadays, judicial systems of many western countries use randomization procedures







gz006/5364622 by Bukkyo U
niversity user on 17 April 2019
to select the jury and/or the court in charge of judging a legal case. Randomization procedures can also
be used to choose who gets drafted into the army, see Fienberg (1971).
All of the aforementioned historical examples include the appointment of jurors and judges by
complex procedures involving a mixture of the following aspects: (1) Pre-selection of a pool of able or
qualified candidates; (2) Voting or election by secret ballot; (3) Proportional representation constraints
(by district, tribe or family, corporate guild, professional specialty, etc.); and, finally, at some point(s)
in the appointment process, (4) Sortition, i.e. random selection among possible candidates.
Based on surviving original manuscripts and secondary literature, the references in this section give
detailed accounts of how sortition was used in several historical examples. However, the original
sources give us very little explanation of why sortition was used. Archaic religious texts see the ritual
use of randomization devices as a doorway for the manifestation of divine will, but the aforementioned
civilizations quickly realized that sortition also brought important practical advantages. Nevertheless,
the articulation of good rational arguments for the use of sortition and randomization had to wait the
development of Mathematical Statistics in the 20th century. This is the topic of our next section.
1.2 Decoupling, separation and haphazardness
Why do we randomize? Legal systems of modern societies use sortition as a firewall, a technological
barrier designed to prevent spurious communication of vested interests or illegitimate interference
between parties in a legal case and agents of the legal system. Its purpose is to warrant impartial or non-
partisan justice, literally, assure that no party (person, group of persons or social organizations),
directly or indirectly involved or interested in a legal case, could illegally intervene or manipulate
the due legal process.
Judges and jurors do not come to court as blank slates. They had a life history full of experiences that
formed individual opinions, prejudices and idiosyncrasies. Hence, the opportunity given to a party to
divert the case to a sympathetic judge or to select favourable jurors would constitute a virulent ma-
nipulation mechanism.
A similar situation is faced by statisticians and physicians when planning and conducting clinical
trials, i.e. studies designed to test the performance of a newly proposed or alternative treatment for a
given disease. For the sake of treatment comparison, patients taking part in the clinical trial have to be
divided into a control-group, receiving an old treatment, a placebo, or no treatment whatsoever; and a
treatment-group, receiving the newly proposed treatment. Giving the opportunity, participating patients
would manifest their preferences, and try by all means possible to get their preferred choice of treatment.
Wealthy and well-educated patients would be better informed, would make better choices, would be in
better position to get their preferred treatment, but would also probably have better chances to overcome
the disease and get well anyway. Hence, such confounding effects would ruin the very investigative
purpose of the clinical trial; see Pearl (2004) and Stern (2008). Truly randomized experiments in
empirical legal studies are far less frequent, requiring sophisticated statistical design and legal planning
to reconcile scientific, moral and ethical constraints; for interesting examples, see Stern (2008).
As well known by contemporary scientists, randomization is the key instrument used in statistics to
overcome the aforementioned conundrums related to avoid confounding effects and partial judgments.
In this context, decoupling refers to randomization techniques aiming to eliminate systematic vulner-
abilities to uncontrolled influences received from or exerted by participating agents; see Laureto et al.
(2012, p. 195). Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), Joseph Jastrow (1863–1944) and Ronald Aylmer
Fisher (1890–1962) introduced the key concept of randomization in Mathematical Statistics, as
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succinctly expressed by Judea Pearl in the following quotation; see also, Peirce and Jastrow (1884),
Fisher (1926), Fisher (1935) and Stern (2008).
Fisher’s great insight was that connecting the new link to a random coin flip ‘guarantees’
that the link we wish to break is actually broken. The reason is that a random coin is
assumed to be unaffected by anything we can measure on macroscopic level - including,
of course, a patient’s socioeconomic background.1
Pearl (2000) further develops the axiomatic study of related issues, and encodes the concepts of
decoupling by randomization in the language of abstract inference diagrams, giving the all-important
formal definition of d-separation. Furthermore, Dennis Lindley (1923–2013) uses the word haphaz-
ardness to distinguish clearly between the desired effect of decoupling, from randomness, the tool used
to achieve it; see next quotation.
The Role of Randomization in Inference: We describe a possible allocation that the
experimenter judges to be free of covariate interference as haphazard. Randomization
may be a convenient way of producing a haphazard design. We argue that it is the hap-
hazard nature, and not the randomization, that is important.2
Notwithstanding the important conceptual distinction highlighted by Lindley, randomization re-
mains the most basic and fundamental tool used to achieve decoupling in modern statistics.
Nevertheless, this conceptual distinction opens the possibility for improvement, by development of
more efficient techniques used to render well-decoupled designs; see for example, Stern (2008),
Laureto et al. (2012), Fossaluza et al. (2015) and Lauretto et al. (2017). Finally, the consistent use
of randomization techniques as well as the compliance with the implied protocols can be investigated
and audited, to some extent, with tools provided by Mathematical Statistics and computational data
analysis; this is the goal of Section 2.
1.3 Managing randomization procedures: traps and pitfalls
In light of the former discussion, the advantages and the necessity of randomized case assignment
procedures should be evident. In the Brazilian judicial system, the benefits of randomized procedures
are nowadays broadly accepted, but there are also many doubts concerning best implementation
practices. There are misgivings about the possibility of abuse and corruption of the current procedures,
but subjective perceptions and opinions vary concerning the widespread or systemic versus the punc-
tual or isolated nature of possible malfunctions or anomalies. These and related topics have been an
area of continuous research in the international literature; see Aney et al. (2017), Anderson (2016),
Chilton and Levy (2015), Eisenberg et al. (2012), Levy (2017), Macfarlane (2014). In contrast, the
same topics have rarely been the object of academic studies in Brazil, some possible reasons for this
contrast are explained below.
Security through obscurity is a fallacy of paramount importance in the discussions concerning
randomization procedures currently taking place at the Brazilian judicial system. This fallacy is
recognized as the source of many false arguments justifying the use of secret designs and proprietary
codes in the implementation of sensitive procedures (as those related to the subject of this article). In
1 (Pearl, 2000, p. 348) also quoted in Stern (2008, p. 59).
2 (Lindley, 1982, pp. 438–439), also quoted in Fossaluza et al. (2015, p. 173).
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contrast, Security by design relies on transparency and auditability as powerful aids for achieving
robust and reliable security properties.
Security through obscurity and Security by design are standard expressions used in the software
industry, but the issue predates the computer age and its interest extends far beyond the particularities
of any specific area of application. At the London Great Exhibition of 1851, the locksmith Alfred
Charles Hobbs gave sensational demonstrations on how to pick poorly designed locks, generating a
heated controversy concerning the consequences of exposing the weaknesses of existing security
systems. Nevertheless, his actions forced manufacturers to improve their designs, and only a few
years later he was awarded a medal by the Institution of Civil Engineers for his contributions to the
field. Sadly, mankind has a tendency to forget hard-learned lessons; see Stross (2006) for examples of
absurd (or tragicomic) legal and police action by the Transportation Security Administration and the
FBI against those who dare to expose existing flaws in airport security systems.
Already in 1883, the Dutch linguist Auguste Kerckhoffs published his basic principles for good
cryptographic systems, including the following requirements: (1) The system must be substantially, if
not mathematically, undecipherable; (2) The system design must not require secrecy and it can be
stolen by the enemy without causing troubles; see Kerckhoffs (1883). These are considered the first
clear formulation of modern principles of: (1) Security by design; and (2) No reliance on security by
obscurity. Moreover, on one hand, transparency facilitates the early detection of design flaws or code
errors, an effect known in computer science as Linus’s law. On the other hand, security by obscurity
requires system developers, managers and operators with special privileges, and those are often the
entry point of malicious interventions. A system designed using the principle of least privilege elim-
inates such unnecessary vulnerabilities. For the principles discussed in this paragraph, see Pfleeger and
Pfleeger (2015), Raymond (1999), and Wattenhofer (2017).
For well-documented case-studies concerning potential security hazards posed by internal mali-
cious intervention in information systems that are obscurely specified see Courtois (2009), where the
author concludes:
We must realize that the secrecy of a product specification poses a threat of a very large-
scale electronic subversion. We need to have the courage to examine these questions and
stop pretending that research in security is about discovering vulnerabilities that are always
not intentional. . . . developers are also potential attackers for all such systems and trade/
industrial secrets should always be regarded as, potentially, a very major security breach.
Randomization procedures currently in use at the Brazilian judicial system are diverse, often kept
under tight secrecy and, in some circumstances, even rely on manual or mechanical devices. Although
such devices could in principle provide effective randomization, they are intrinsically opaque, hard to
audit and inefficient for expeditious or real time processing.
As should be expected, all matters related to the use and implementation of randomization proced-
ures in the judicial system are highly sensitive, and the consequences of changing established pro-
cedures are difficult to control: On the one hand, improvements of such procedures are often motivated
by rather technical aspects concerning statistical soundness, automated tracing and auditability, com-
putational efficiency, etc. On the other hand, the motivations, intentions and consequences of proposed
improvements can be easily misunderstood. Any procedural improvement, change of functionality or
revocation of privilege also has the potential of casting doubts or false impression about the potential
or actual weaknesses and vulnerabilities of procedures currently in use, and such misunderstanding can
generate further disruptions and liabilities; see Maurushat (2013) and Haber and Hibbert (2018).
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Given the preceding considerations, a judicial system must manage such matters with great care,
taking precautionary steps to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings that could delay or even halt the
implementation of beneficial improvements. This is one of the goals of the research reported in this
article. We seek to dissipate the fear of widespread systemic biases, and to point the limits of what can
be accomplished by post-hoc statistical analyses, hence paving the way for subsequent steps in re-
search and system reengineering.
2. Statistical modelling of case assignments
A model to assess randomness in case assignment may be applied to the following abstract scenario.
Suppose there is a courthouse constituted of n judges and that new cases arrive daily and must be
assigned to one of them. Also, assume that it is of interest to study the mechanism of case assignment
of the courthouse, in order to examine the possibility of a tendency towards assigning cases to a
specific judge, under particular circumstances. To meet this goal, the probability of a new case being
assigned to each judge, under given circumstances, may be modelled.
In order to fit such a model, a sample of case assignments is needed. The sample must contain the
number of cases that were assigned to each judge daily for a fixed period of time. Furthermore, it must
also present the circumstances under which such case assignments occurred. These circumstances are
represented by variables that summarize the daily conditions of the courthouse regarding possible
sources of bias in the assignment process.
The caseload of the judges, the nature of the cases that have arrived (their class3 and their relation to
cases already being handled by the court) and the availability of each judge to receive new cases are
known mechanism that may alter the assignment probabilities, which can be added to the model. Judges
with a greater caseload shall have a smaller probability of being assigned a new case. Cases that are related
to a case already assigned to a judge may not partake in any random assignment process and be assigned
directly to the judge handling its related case (related-case rule). Moreover, if a judge is not available to
receive new cases, his or her probability of being assigned a case must be set to zero. Such conditions take
particular forms at each court, and cannot be precisely described by any known general formulation.
A reliable characterization of the daily conditions of the courthouse is essential, for it is desirable to
model any tendencies in the case assignment process, so that any bias still present on the fitted model is
due to randomness or an unknown source. It is important that the circumstances under which a case
was assigned be presented in the sample so that it may be incorporated to the model, in order to reliably
model mechanisms that may alter the respective assignment probabilities.
The model chosen for the case under study is a Multinomial Logistic Regression (Hilbe, 2009),
which is presented in details in the Appendix. This regression models the probability of a case being
assigned to a judge as a non-linear function of numerical variables that represent the conditions under
which the case is assigned. Other kinds of known sources of bias, which may not be represented by
numerical variables, may also be incorporated to the model.
2.1 Case study of the Brazilian Supreme Court
The assignment of cases in the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has recently
become a matter of public interest due to the publicity of the corruption cases related to the Car Wash
3 The cases a court is eligible to receive may be divided into classes, according to their purpose. For example, Habeas Corpus
may be a class containing all habeas petitions received by the court.
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operation4 (Operação Lava Jato) heard by the court. Various media outlets have made inquiries to the
court about the assignment process in order to fully understand how the assignment of these important
cases is performed, especially after the death of the rapporteur5 of the Car Wash operation in the court,
which automatically received all cases related to the operation. However, the court has not fully
attended these inquiries, limiting itself to say that the assignment process is randomly performed by
a closed source algorithm taking into account the related-case rule, the caseloads and the number of
cases assigned to a justice chair6 in the past. Therefore, the assignment process of the court is unknown
to the public, and is not auditable by the involved parties.
The interest of the parties on the judge that receives a case is justified by the fact that he or she
becomes its rapporteur and may take three actions regarding its trial. The rapporteur may reach a
monocratic verdict; take the case to trial in front of a pre-defined judge panel7; or take the case to the
plenary-court (en banc), which is formed by all 11 judges of the court. If the assigned judge chooses to
take the case to trial, he or she must present a report detailing his or her decision about the merits of the
case, on which the other judges may agree or dissent. The court decision about the case is made upon
the majority agreeing or dissenting on the rapporteur opinion. Thus, the fact that a group of judges may
be more sympathetic to some causes, and the willingness of the assigned judge to make a monocratic
decision, or take the case to the judge panel or en banc trial, add to the importance of the assignment
process, so it plays a role in the course of a case.
In view of this, we fit the abstract model outlined in the preceding section to a sample of case
assignments of the Brazilian Supreme Court. The sample contains the number of cases of each class
assigned to each justice chair of the court between 28 February 2008 and 10 July 2017. At the
considered period of time, cases of 35 different classes were assigned to the 11 chairs of the court,
although only 14 classes of cases are considered, as there were less than a thousand cases of each one of
the other classes assigned over the 10-year period. Considering only the assignments of the top 14
classes, the sample amounts to 22 720 assignments.8
Table 1 presents the number of cases of each class that were assigned during the considered period
of time to each justice chair, and Figure 1 presents the proportion of the cases of the class Special
Appeal with Aggravation, which were assigned daily for each chair. The cases of this class are special
appeals, which, as set forth in the constitution, should be heard by the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
this is also the class with more cases assigned in the considered period.
Although thousands of cases are assigned to the court each year, they are in general not immediately
tried and the court may take years to reach a decision. Indeed, there are cases from decades ago
awaiting decision from the court. The reason for the great number of cases assigned to the court is the
4 A massive operation carried out by Brazilian Federal Police, which started targeting money laundering, and in the last four
years has uncovered a variety of corruption schemes throughout the government and state-owned companies.
5 The rapporteur is the judge of the court responsible for analysing the case and presenting a report expressing his or her
opinion about the matter at hand to the court, so that it can reach a decision about it. The rapporteur may also choose to reach a
monocratic decision in some circumstances.
6 The Brazilian Supreme Court is formed by justice chairs, each one having a minister (judge). When a minister retires, his or
her caseload is transferred to the newly appointed minister of his or her chair. Therefore, in order to follow the caseload of each
minister over time, it is convenient to consider that the cases are assigned to the chair, not to the minister.
7 The Brazilian Supreme Court is formed by two fixed judge panels, of five judges each, which may rule about the cases
assigned to its members. The court president is not part of any panel.
8 One for each day and class. If in a day there were assigned cases of m different classes, then there were m random samples in
this day. Note that multiple cases are assigned in each assignment, so in the considered period of time 628 819 cases were
assigned to the chairs. Each assignment may be modelled as a multinomial distribution with size in general greater than one, so
that not necessarily all cases of a given class received in a day are assigned to a same judge.
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FIG. 1. Proportion of cases of the class Special Appeal with Aggravation assigned daily to each chair.10
10 The dotted line represents the 0.10 proportion, which is the proportion of cases that is expected to be assigned to each chair if
the assignment process is performed randomly and uniformly among the chairs, i.e. each chair having the same probability to
receive a new case, as no case of this class is assigned to the court president. This class of case was created in 2011 and the
period of time in which a chair systematically receives no cases refers to when the chair was empty.
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large range of cases under its jurisdiction, which contrasts with U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
which has a narrower range of cases under its jurisdiction; grants plenary review to about 80 cases; and
disposes of about a hundred cases without plenary review, each year.11
It can be seen in Figure 1 that there are some justice chairs that systematically receive a greater
proportion of cases of class Special Appeal with Aggravation for a period, although this may be
explained by some kind of known mechanism and may not be evidence of lack of randomness in
the case assignment process. In addition, we see in Table 1 that there are some chairs that have received
a greater percentage of the cases, with special attention to chair 1 that has received 13.4% of all cases.
However, such fluctuations do not directly indicate the existence of systematic bias because, at dif-
ferent times and circumstances, some chairs may not be available to receive a given case. The avail-
ability to receive cases is a circumstance of each assignment, which could be regarded by a regression
model as a source of bias.
The case assignment process of the Brazilian Supreme Court has some known mechanisms that may
change the assignment probabilities, which must be controlled. Indeed, although 11 justice chairs form
the court, at least one of them is unavailable for receiving new cases, as one of the ministers is the court
president and, therefore, occupies the presidency chair and does not receive new cases from the
random assignment process.12 Furthermore, there may be other empty chairs, for when a minister
retires, his or her chair remains empty for a period of time, until a new minister is appointed by the
President of the Republic and approved by the Senate. Indeed, these are known mechanism that may
cause a chair to receive more or less cases, which are included in the model as structural zeros and not
as numerical variables that describe the circumstances of the case assignment.
In each assignment, there are two types of zeros when no case is assigned to a chair: when it is not
available to receive cases and when it is available, but receives no cases nonetheless. This fact is taken
into account by the model, so that it becomes a Multinomial Logistic Regression Model with Structural
Zeros, for which more details are given in the Appendix.
Another mechanism that may alter the assignment probabilities is the related-case rule, by which
some cases are not randomly assigned, but are directly assigned to a specific chair that is handling
related cases. The available sample does not distinguish the cases that were randomly assigned from
the cases that were not and, therefore, this mechanism cannot be incorporated to the model. However,
it should not affect all classes of cases. On the one hand, cases from classes as Habeas Corpus and
Habeas Corpus Appeal are prone to be related to a case already being handled by the court. On the
other hand, cases from the class Direct Unconstitutionality Action are believed to not be in general
related to a case being handled by the court. Furthermore, the caseload of each chair at the moment of
the assignment, which may alter the assignment probabilities (chairs with lesser caseload may have a
greater probability of receiving a case), is another mechanism that may alter probabilities which cannot
be added to the model, as it is not available at the sample.
The model for the Brazilian Supreme Court considers only one variable describing the circum-
stances under which each case assignment was performed. The variable considered in our analysis is
the proportion of cases of each class that have been assigned to each chair since 2001 to the day of the
assignment, as the court claims (without presenting any evidence) that, together with other quantities
not available in the sample, as the caseloads of the chairs, the cases are assigned taking into account the
11 See https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx.
12 The court president receives cases that are exclusive to the presidency chair. Therefore, the president minister does not
partake on the random assignment process.
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FIG. 2. Confidence intervals for the probabilities of a new case of a given class being assigned to each justice chair.13
13 The probabilities were estimated by the first Multinomial Logistic Regression model, which supposes that they depend only
on the class of the case. The confidence of the intervals is 99% and they are corrected by the Bonferroni method (Neter et al.,
1990, p. 164).
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number of cases assigned to each chair in the past. However, the court does not disclose how the
assignment algorithm takes into account this proportion when assigning cases, being very secretive
about the procedures used for allocation and randomization.
In order to circumvent this missing information, the probability of a chair receiving a new case of a
given class is modelled as a non-linear function of the proportion of cases of the class assigned to the
chair since 2001 to the day of the assignment. The proportion assigned since 2001 is considered for this
is the earliest date on which we could gather information about the number of cases assigned yearly to
each chair. This proportion is updated daily according to the cases assigned at the previous day.
In our first model, we suppose that the probability of a case being assigned to a chair depends only
on the class of the case. Figure 2 presents the confidence intervals for the probabilities, estimated by
this model, of a new case of a given class being assigned to each chair. These probabilities are
estimated taking into account the structural zeros, so they should differ from the percentages in
Table 1. These probabilities should be compared with 1/11 as, even though there has not been any
assignment in the considered period of time in which all the 11 chairs were available to receive new
cases, the proportion 1/11 must be considered as the equilibrium, as the unavailable chairs have not
been always the same on all assignments. Indeed, eleven different ministers from nine different chairs
have occupied the presidency chair since 2001. Therefore, with this rotation of president ministers, we
expect that, under the assumption that the cases are distributed craving to balance off the number
of cases of each class assigned to the chairs, each chair should have received 1/11 of the cases, and not
1/10.
Furthermore, as the objective of the model is to detect the existence of systematic tendencies
towards assigning cases of a specific class to a specific chair, it is necessary to suppose that all
chairs are available to receive new cases, for otherwise we would have to choose ad hoc a chair to
be unavailable to receive cases. Moreover, the mathematical properties of the fitted statistical model,
i.e. the incorporation of the structural zeros, allow for the estimation of the probability of all 11 chairs
to receive a new case of a given class, even though at most ten chairs are available for receiving cases at
each assignment.
The confidence intervals of the model under consideration were estimated by the Multinomial
Logistic Regression detailed in the Appendix. From the estimated intervals, we see that, for all classes,
the probability of a chair receiving new cases is most often less than 0.15, with just a few probabilities
greater than this threshold. Hence, there is no strong evidence indicating large biases on the assign-
ment process. Nevertheless, for all classes, we reject that the probability is the same for all chairs, i.e.
the difference between the probabilities of assignment are statistically significant, as not all confidence
intervals contain the equilibrium 1/11, for all classes. However, the difference is not practically
significant on most of the classes, as the probabilities are homogeneous, though different.
In our second model, we suppose that the probability of a case being assigned to a chair depends on
the class of the case and on the proportion of cases of the class assigned to the chair since 2001 to the
day of the assignment. The probabilities estimated by this model, supposing that each chair received 1/
11 of the cases of each class assigned from 2001 to the day of the assignment, are presented in Figure 3,
where they may be compared with 1/11. We see that, apart from class AC, in which all intervals
contain14 1/11, for all other classes we reject that the probability is the same for all chairs. However, yet
again, the difference is not practically significant on most of the classes, as the probabilities are
homogeneous, though different (see classes AI, Inq and RHC, for example).
14 So that we do not reject the hypothesis that the probability of a new case being assigned to a chair is equal for all chairs.
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FIG. 3. Confidence intervals for the probabilities of a new case of a given class being assigned to each justice chair, supposing
that each chair received 1/11 of the cases of the class assigned since 2001 to the day of the assignment.15
15 The probabilities were estimated by the second Multinomial Logistic Regression model, which supposes that they depend on
the class of the cases and the proportion of cases of the class assigned to a chair since 2001 to the day of the assignment. The
confidence of the intervals is 99% and they are also corrected by the Bonferroni method.
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Nevertheless, there are classes in which some chairs have a higher probability of receiving a new
case (see classes ADI, ARE, MS, Pet and RMS for example). In these classes, even though all chairs
have been assigned the same proportion of cases, some of them have a higher probability of receiving a
new case, what points to the existence of some tendency on the assignment process. This tendency may
be either intrinsic to the assignment process, i.e. a flaw of the process, or not be part of the assignment
process itself, but be rather caused by some variable that is not being taken into account by our model
(as the related-case rule and the caseload of each chair, for example). Therefore, although we see that
the probability of some chairs receiving a new case deviates from their expected values, we cannot
conclude that the process itself is biased (at least not without further studies taking into account other
factors that may alter the probabilities of assignment).
Furthermore, hard conclusions about the fairness of the assignment processes cannot be reached by
post-hoc statistical analyses. A thorough analysis of the randomization and assignment procedures
requires appropriate means and methods conceived at the design stage and built in the system as pre-
defined functionalities, as discussed in Section 1.3. Only under such conditions would it be possible to
determine for sure the existence (or not) of specific biases and flaws in the processes under scrutiny.
3. Final remarks and future research
The statistical analyses in the preceding sections give us a global assessment of the allocation process.
Although we detect deviations from expected statistics, indicating the existence of systematic biases
on the random allocation of judicial cases, we cannot make any conclusions about the fairness or
appropriate randomization process of any individual judicial case. Such a conclusion cannot be
reached by post-hoc statistical analysis of historical data. Furthermore, the systematic biases may
be created by sources that, though unknown on the dataset at hand, are known to the court (as for
example, the cases that fit the related-case rule and the caseloads of each chair).
Finally, given the juridical and social importance of the themata under scrutiny, we believe that it is
important to develop randomization procedures in full compliance with the following desiderata: (a)
Statistical soundness, see Hammersley and Handscomb (1964, Ch. 3), Haramoto et al. (2008), Knuth
(1997, Ch. 3) and Ripley (1987, Ch. 2); (b) Procedural, cryptographical and computational security,
see Boyar (1989), L’Ecuyer (2012) and Wattenhofer (2017); (c) Complete auditability, see Haber and
Stornetta (1991); (d) Open-source programming; (e) Multiple hardware platform and operating system
implementation; (f) User friendliness and transparency, see Parikh and Pauly (2012); (g) Flexibility
and adaptability for the needs and requirements of multiple application areas (like, for example,
clinical trials, selection of jury or judges in legal proceedings, and draft lotteries). These are important
topics of current and further research.
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Appendix: Technical details
In this Appendix, we present the details of the Multinomial Logistic Regression that is applied to
the Brazilian Supreme Court. This regression model aims to model the logarithm of the odds in
favour of a case being assigned to a justice chair over a so-called reference chair under given
circumstances. The mathematical structure of the model imposes that a reference chair is fixed so
that the probability of a case being assigned to a chair is compared with the probability of this same
case being assigned to the reference chair through the respective odds. The logarithm of the odds is
then modelled as a linear function of the numerical variables that represent the courthouse circum-
stances at the moment of the assignment. For more details about Logistic Regression models see
Hilbe (2009).
Let J be the variable that indicates to which justice chair a given case is to be assigned. This
variable takes values in f1; . . .; ng, as each one of the n chairs may be represented by a number.
Also, let ðxj;1; . . .; xj;kÞ be a set of numerical variables that represent the circumstances of chair j
when the assignment occurred, and define ðv1; . . .; vnÞ as vj ¼ 1 if chair j 2 f1; . . .; ng is available
for receiving cases, and zero otherwise. Note that vj introduces a structural zeros mechanism into
the model, i.e. a mechanism that causes a chair to be empty and the number of cases assigned to it to
be zero. Considering that the reference chair is the number 1 and that v1 ¼ 1, i.e. the reference chair
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is always available for receiving cases, the Multinomial Logistic Regression with Structural Zeros
may be written as
log
P J ¼ jj xj;1; . . .; xj;k
 
; 1; v2; . . .; vnð Þ
 
P J ¼ 1j xj;1; . . .; xj;k
 
; 1; v2; . . .; vnð Þ
  ! ¼  jð Þ0 + jð Þ1 xj;1+   + jð Þk xj;k if vj ¼ 1
P J ¼ j xj;1; . . .; xj;k
 
; 1; v2; . . .; vnð Þ
 
¼ 0 if vj ¼ 0
8>><>>: ð1Þ
for j ¼ 2; . . .; n, in which P represents probability. Observe that in model (1) each chair has its own
parameters. In addition, for simplification, we consider that all chairs have the same number k of
parameters, which is not necessary.
In order to estimate the parameters ðjÞ0 ; . . .; 
ðjÞ
k ; j 2 f2; . . .; ng; of the model by the Maximum
Likelihood Method it is necessary to have a sample (Y;V;X) of size m given by
V ¼ v1;1; . . .; v1;n
 
;    ; vm;1; . . .; vm;n
  
Y ¼ y1;1; . . .; y1;n
 
;    ; ym;1; . . .; ym;n
  
X ¼ x1;1; . . .; x1;n
 
;    ; xm;1; . . .; xm;n
  
xs;j ¼ ðxs;j;1; . . .; xs;j;kÞ; s ¼ 1; . . .;m; j ¼ 1; . . .; n
in which ys;j is the number of cases assigned to chair j at assignment s; vs;j equals one if chair j was
available for receiving cases at assignment s and zero otherwise; and xs;j are the numerical variables that





























with the convention that ð1Þ0 ¼ 
ð1Þ
1 ¼    ¼ 
ð1Þ
k ¼ 0. The estimates
bðjÞ0 ; . . .;bðjÞk ; j 2 f2; . . .; ng;
of the parameters are obtained by maximizing the likelihood presented above, and the probability of a
new case being assigned to chair j, under new circumstances Xm+1 ¼ ðxm+1;1; . . .; xm+1;nÞ and Vm+1
¼ ð1; vm+1;2; . . .; vm+1;nÞ is estimated by
P J ¼ jjXm+1;Vm+1ð Þ ¼





vm+1;lexp bðlÞ0 +bðlÞ1 xm+1;l;1+   +bðlÞk xm+1;l;k
 !
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again with the convention that bð1Þ0 ¼bð1Þ1 ¼    ¼bð1Þk ¼ 0. Confidence intervals for these prob-
abilities may also be obtained applying the properties of Maximum Likelihood Estimators (Rao, 1973,
Chapter 5).
We will consider two distinct models for the Brazilian Supreme Court that are particular forms of
(1). In the first model, we suppose that the probability depends only on the class of the case:
log
PðJ ¼ jjðxj;1; . . .; xj;14Þ; ð1; v2; . . .; v11ÞÞ
PðJ ¼ 1jðxj;1; . . .; xj;14Þ; ð1; v2; . . .; v11ÞÞ
 
¼ ðjÞ1 xj;1+   +
ðjÞ
14xj;14 if vj ¼ 1
PðJ ¼ jjðxj;1; . . .; xj;14Þ; ð1; v2; . . .; v11ÞÞ ¼ 0 if vj ¼ 0
8><>:
for j ¼ 2; . . .; 11, in which xj;i ¼ 1; i 2 f1; . . .; 14g,
16 if the class of the process is the i-th and zero
otherwise. This model has 140 parameters, one for each class and chair, but the first.
In the second model, we suppose that the logit (1) depends on the class of the case and on the
proportion of cases assigned to the chair since 2001:
log
P J ¼ j xj;1; . . .; xj;15
 
; 1; v2; . . .; v11ð Þ
 
P J ¼ 1 xj;1; . . .; xj;15
 
; 1; v2; . . .; v11ð Þ
  ! ¼  jð Þ1 xj;1+   + jð Þ15xj;15 if vj ¼ 1
P J ¼ j xj;1; . . .; xj;15
 
; 1; v2; . . .; v11ð Þ
 
¼ 0 if vj ¼ 0
8>><>>:
for j ¼ 2; . . .; 11, in which xj;i ¼ 1; i 2 f1; . . .; 14g, if the class of the process is the i th and zero
otherwise, and xj;15 is the proportion of cases of the class assigned to chair j since 2001. There are 150
parameters in this model, one for each class and chair, but the first, adding up to 140 parameters, and
one for each chair that refers to the proportion.
In both models, the structural zeros are differentiated from the real zeros so that we may estimate
the probability of each one of the 11 chairs receiving a new case, even though there are never 11 chairs
available to receive cases. Therefore, we should compare the estimated probabilities with 1/11, as there
are 11 of them and we seek to establish if they are equal.
16 We represent the classes by numbers as it makes the notation clearer. We may number the classes in an arbitrary order,
without loss of generality.
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